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In this article I argue that, despite the views of such theorists as Locke, Hart and
Raz, most of a person’s property rights cannot be individualistically justified. Instead
most property rights, if justified at all, must be justified on non-individualistic (e.g.
consequentialist) grounds. This, I suggest, implies that most property rights cannot be
morally fundamental ‘human rights’.
I. INDIVIDUALISTIC JUSTIFICATION
What, if anything, justifies the existence of property rights? In my view,
property rights are justified because they serve the collective interest.
Against this, many theorists regard the justification of property rights
as individualistic. I show in this article that most property rights
cannot be individualistically justified. Furthermore, I argue that
individualistic justification is the hallmark of those especially morally
important rights that we call ‘human rights’. Hence because most
property rights cannot be individualistically justified, most property
rights cannot be human rights.
My concept, ‘individualistic justification’, refers to an approach to
rights adopted by a range of thinkers including Locke, Hart and Raz,
an approach that contrasts with consequentialist, communitarian and
contractualist accounts of the justification of rights. A person P’s right
R is individualistically justified if and only if:
1. Some genuine feature F of P is of sufficient intrinsic importance
on its own to constitute a powerful pro tanto reason in favour of
P’s holding a right that will protect, serve or in some other way
ensure respect for F – and R is such a right.
2. This pro tanto reason is undefeated and hence R is justified.
Three terms in the definition merit explanation. (a) Genuine. A
right is only individualistically justified if it is justified on the
basis of some genuine feature of its holder such as P’s interest
in bodily integrity, rather than some gimmicky relational feature
such as P’s-being-such-that-P’s-holding-R-would-serve-the-collective-
interest. To rule out justifications of the latter type, one should read
‘genuine feature’ as referring to features of P whose existence is
logically (but not necessarily causally) independent of the existence
of P’s wider community, and of the collective interest. (b) Intrinsic.
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Some genuine feature of P, such as P’s life or P’s liberty, might be
of instrumental importance in securing protection for some feature
of someone else – for example, a pregnant woman’s life is of great
importance in securing the life of her unborn child.1 A pregnant
woman’s right not to be executed, justified only on the basis of the
instrumental importance of her life for her unborn child, would not
qualify as individualistically justified on my account. Rights are only
individualistically justified when they are justified by the intrinsic
rather than instrumental value of some genuine feature of the right-
holder.2 (c)Powerful. Consequentialists (and also some communitarians
and contractualists) will not deny the individualistic claim that certain
genuine features (perhaps P’s interests or preferences) of a person P are
of sufficient intrinsic importance on their own to constitute pro tanto
reasons in favour of rights for P. But consequentialists, communitarians
and contractualists will deny that these pro tanto reasons are ‘powerful’
in the following sense: powerful pro tanto reasons cannot be defeated
by most competing reasons; powerful pro tanto reasons are normative
‘breakwaters’ that can rarely be defeated. In particular, such reasons
cannot be defeated merely by the collective interest, or by some
group’s interest, or by the choices of a majority of contractors.3 Thus
individualistic justifications of rights, as I understand them, contrast
with consequentialist, communitarian and contractualist justifications.
The intuitive idea is that an individualistically justified right is
justified ultimately by the great intrinsic importance of certain features
of its holder, considered independently of their effect on other people.
1 This example is drawn from Joseph Raz, ‘Rights and Individual Well-Being’, in his
Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford, 1995),
p. 50.
2 I use ‘intrinsic value’ here simply to mean non-instrumental value. Thus I follow Raz
and diverge from Korsgaard, who uses ‘intrinsic value’ to refer only to a sub-class (the
‘unconditionally valuable’) of what is non-instrumentally valuable (Christine Korsgaard,
‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’, The Philosophical Review 92 (1983), pp. 169–95; for Raz’s
broader use of ‘intrinsic value’ see his TheMorality of Freedom (Oxford, 1986), pp. 177–8).
3 Why are the reasons that individualistically justify rights defeasible at all? In my
view, there can be no right that would be justified even if it imposed massive burdens on
others; hence all rights – including individualistically justified rights – must be justified
on the basis of defeasible reasons. To say that these reasons are ‘powerful’ is to say
that, just as rights themselves are ‘trumps’ or ‘breakwaters’ that normally defeat ‘some
background justification for political decisions that states a goal for the community as
a whole’, so the reasons in favour of individualistically justified rights are similarly
‘trumps’ or ‘breakwaters’ that normally defeat competing reasons (the quotation is from
Ronald Dworkin, ‘Rights as Trumps’, Theories of Rights, ed. J. Waldron (Oxford, 1984),
p. 153; for the idea of rights as ‘breakwaters’, see David Rodin, War and Self-Defense
(Oxford, 2002), p. 25). By contrast, consequentialist, communitarian and contractualist
approaches to rights, while recognizing that rights themselves are normative ‘trumps’
or ‘breakwaters’, deny that rights’ justification is grounded in ‘trumping’ or ‘breakwater’
reasons that cannot be defeated by the collective interest or by some group’s interest, or
by the choices of a majority of contractors.
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These features constitute powerful reasons in favour of rights for the
feature-bearers. For example, Fred’s right not to have his arm chopped
off is plausibly individualistically justified. It is attractive to regard the
integrity of Fred’s body as a feature of Fred that is of sufficient intrinsic
importance on its own – independently of whether this serves people
other than Fred – to constitute a powerful reason in favour of rights
protecting it, including a right that Fred’s arm not be chopped off.
The self-ownership-based, labour-mixing aspects of Locke’s thought
offer an individualistic theory of property rights. Locke’s self-ownership
theory takes the intrinsic moral importance of the individual person,
as secured by his or her self-ownership rights, to constitute a powerful
reason for that person’s holding powers of acquisition-through-labour.4
This individualistic reading of Locke might seem inconsistent with
both (a) Locke’s initial premiss that ‘God gave the World to Men in
common . . . for their benefit, and the greatest Conveniencies of Life
they were capable to draw from it’, and (b) Locke’s adherence to his
famous ‘proviso’ on acquisitions.5 (a) Some interpreters read Locke as a
consequentialist or a communitarian;6 but I contend that Locke holds
that God’s purpose in giving the world to people in common was for
the benefit of each individual person, rather than for the benefit of
people collectively.7 On this reading, the reasons in favour of a specific
person’s acquiring private property rights in some portion of what was
originally given to mankind in common will be ultimately grounded
in the intrinsic moral importance of that individual person. (b) The
‘Lockean proviso’ specifies that any initial acquisition of property
is only justified when ‘enough, and as good [is] left in common for
others’.8 This proviso, with its reference to ‘others’, appears non-
individualistic. However, on closer inspection Locke’s position turns
out to be individualistic because the self-ownership-based reasons in
favour of property rights are ‘powerful’ reasons, in the technical sense
outlined above. The defeasibility condition encapsulated in the proviso
does not maintain that a person’s powers of acquisition are defeated
whenever this would serve the greater good or would serve some
group or whenever a majority of contractors would wish this to be so.
4 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge, 1963), II. 26–8 (all references
to Locke’s Two Treatises cite Treatise number followed by Section number).
5 For (a), see ibid. II. 34; see also II. 25–6. For (b), see II. 27.
6 A. John Simmons,The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton, 1992), pp. 50–9;Matthew
H. Kramer, John Locke and the Origins of Private Property: Philosophical Explorations
of Individualism, Community and Equality (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 92–318.
7 For more details on this individualistic approach to Locke’s conception of the
‘public good’, see my ‘The Justification of Property Rights’, unpublished doctoral thesis,
University of Cambridge, 2002, pp. 34–41. See also Simmons, The Lockean Theory of
Rights, p. 57.
8 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, II. 27; see also II. 33.
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Instead, the proviso specifies that the property-right-justifying reason
generated by an individual’s self-ownership is defeasible only when
‘enough, and as good’ is not left for others. There are debates about how
to interpret this defeasibility condition, but in my view Locke did not
intend nor expect the proviso to result in attempted initial acquisitions
being easily or frequently defeated – rather, Locke understood the
‘proviso’ as a defeasibility condition that reflects the ‘powerfulness’ of
the self-ownership-based reasons in favour of property rights.
While Locke offers an individualistic theory specifically concerning
property rights, other writers have been drawn to the general thesis
that all rights are individualistically justified. For example, Hart
suggests that the recognition of any right ‘implies the recognition of
the equal right of all men to be free’.9 One natural interpretation
of this is that a person’s rights are justified ultimately on the basis
of the intrinsic importance of that individual person’s freedom (an
importance of equal magnitude to the intrinsic importance of the
freedom of each other person). On this understanding, according to
Hart a genuine feature of each right-holding person (their freedom) is
of sufficient intrinsic importance on its own to ground a justification
for that person’s rights. Similarly, when offering a general analysis of
rights, Raz writes that X has a right if and only if ‘X can have rights and,
other things being equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a
sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty’.10
On this view, each right is justified ultimately by a genuine feature
of the right-holding person – though, unlike Hart, Raz holds that the
right-justifying feature is the right-holder’s interest rather than his or
her freedom.
However, Raz is careful to note that his theory allows that in some
cases rights will be justified only by the instrumental value of the
interests of their holders in serving the interests of other people. For
example, the pregnant woman’s right not to be executed is justified
by the instrumental value of her life for her unborn child; and the
right to freedom of expression is – according to Raz – justified by the
fact that everyone’s having freedom of expression is of instrumental
importance in securing the common good. These rights do not qualify
as individualistically justified.11 Nonetheless, implicit in Raz is the
assumption that the individualistic cases are the core cases. For most
rights (including most property rights), it seems fair to read Raz as
9 H. L. A. Hart, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, The Philosophical Review 64 (1955),
pp. 190–1.
10 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 166. See also JeremyWaldron, The Right to Private
Property (Oxford, 1988), pp. 65–102.
11 For the examples, see Raz, ‘Rights and Individual Well-Being’, p. 50 and p. 54. See
also Raz, The Morality of Freedom, pp. 178–80.
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maintaining that certain of their holders’ interests are of sufficient
intrinsic importance on their own to qualify as powerful right-justifying
reasons.
There is a lesson to be drawn from Raz’s attraction to and subsequent
rejection of a fully individualistic approach to all rights. The rights
that most naturally fit the individualistic picture are the stringent,
morally fundamental rights that we call ‘human rights’ – such as
Fred’s right not to have his arm chopped off. It has often been noted
that non-individualistic theories give inadequate accounts of human
rights. For example, according to consequentialism, if the long-run
collective interest would be best promoted by denying human rights
to certain people, then there would be no justification for the existence
of human rights for the relevant people. Concern about this counter-
intuitive implication is, in part, what motivates John Rawls’s famous
claim that ‘[u]tilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction
between persons’.12 If human rights are individualistically justified
then they will offer the special protection grounded in respect for each
separate person that Rawls identifies as necessary. This, I suggest,
is why Hart and Raz are attracted to individualism. However, it is
implausible to regard all rights as individualistically justified. For
example, consider the rights generated by parking regulations. I
shall conclude this article by outlining a two-tier picture on which
some rights (includingmost property rights) are non-individualistically
justified, while other rights (the human rights) are individualistically
justified, and the individualistically justified rights hold moral priority
over non-individualistically justified rights.13 If this is correct, then
much turns on whether property rights are individualistically justified:
in arguing that most property rights cannot be individualistically
justified, not only will I thereby disagree with Locke, Hart and Raz, but
I will also show that most property rights cannot be human rights.14
12 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, 1971), p. 27.
13 Many theorists who focus specifically on human rights assume that they are
individualistically justified. For example, see James Griffin’s personhood-based view in
his ‘First Steps in an Account of Human Rights’, European Journal of Philosophy 9
(2001), pp. 311–15; and see Thomas Pogge’s individualistic remarks on the foundations
of human rights in his World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 55–8.
14 Other theorists who defend alternative individualistic approaches to property rights
include Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (Oxford, 1987) and
John T. Sanders, ‘Projects and Property’, Robert Nozick, ed. D. Schmidtz (Cambridge,
2002), pp. 34–58. Theorists who highlight the individualistic aspects of Locke’s work
include C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to
Locke (Oxford, 1962), pp. 197–221; Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York,
1974), pp. 174–82; Alan Carter, The Philosophical Foundations of Property Rights (Hemel
Hempstead, 1989), pp. 13–24; J. E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford, 1997),
pp. 187–201; Leif Wenar, ‘Original Acquisition of Private Property’, Mind 107 (1998),
pp. 807–9; Sanders, ‘Projects and Property’.
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II. PREMISS (A)
I shall use the phrase ‘individualistic right-justifying feature’ to refer
to any genuine feature of an individual that is of sufficient intrinsic
importance on its own to constitute a powerful pro tanto reason
in favour of rights for that individual. The integrity of Fred’s body
plausibly comprises an individualistic right-justifying feature of Fred.
Using this terminology, the first premiss of my argument against
individualistic justifications for most property rights is as follows:
Premiss (A): any individualistic right-justifying feature that justifies non-
interference rights for a given person will also be at least a weak, overrideable
reason in favour of assistance rights for that person.
To defend premiss (A), we should begin by noting that any
putative individualistic right-justifying feature of a person (such as
the individual’s needs, his or her happiness, the integrity of his or
her body, his or her core interests, his or her liberty, his or her
autonomously formed projects) could be protected and promoted by
the existence of both non-interference rights and assistance rights held
by that individual. Consider Ingrid’s need to continue living. Both non-
interference rights (e.g. rights not to be shot or stabbed) and assistance
rights (e.g. rights to medical assistance, rights to be supplied with
the foods necessary for survival) could contribute significantly to the
satisfaction of Ingrid’s need to continue living. Similarly, consider Jill’s
pursuit of her autonomously chosen project – to make a table from
the lump of wood she has found.15 Both non-interference rights (e.g.
rights allowing Jill freedom to use the lump of wood as she wishes)
and assistance rights (e.g. rights to training in woodwork, and to
the provision of carpentry tools) could contribute significantly to Jill’s
ability to pursue her project. Theremight seem to be three impediments
to the inference from (i) the fact that individualistic right-justifying
features would be protected and promoted if a person held assistance
rights as well as non-interference rights, to (ii) the conclusion that
premiss (A) is correct. However, I argue below that these apparent
impediments fail to undermine this inference.
A. Levels of moral importance and levels of protection
An opponent of my inference from (i) to (ii) could plausibly argue that
certain individualistic right-justifying features (such as Jill’s carpentry
project) are only of moderate moral importance – importance sufficient
to justify a few non-interference rights, but not to comprise a reason in
15 For two prominent individualistic arguments for property rights based on the moral
importance of the individual’s projects, see Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral
Community and Sanders, ‘Projects and Property’.
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favour of all the rights for that person that would maximally protect or
promote that feature.
It should be conceded that sometimes merely moderately important
features of an individual are of sufficient – although only moderate –
intrinsic importance on their own to justify rights. And such
moderately important individualistic right-justifying features will not
constitute reasons in favour of all the rights necessary to secure
maximum protection for the right-justifying features. For example, if
Jill’s carpentry project is of moderate individualistic right-justifying
importance, then at most it will constitute a reason in favour of the
rights that would make it moderately likely that Jill will be able to
proceedwith her carpentry project, rather than all the rights thatwould
maximize Jill’s success at this project.
But this line of reasoning does not undermine the inference from
(i) to (ii). To make it moderately likely that Jill’s carpentry project
flourish, some fairly undemanding assistance rights (e.g. rights
demanding that we provide Jill with a hammer if her project requires
one and we have one available) would be just as useful as some fairly
undemanding non-interference rights (e.g. rights demanding that we
let Jill proceed with her carpentry unless we need the wood urgently for
other activities). The distinction between non-interference rights and
assistance rights does not map onto any distinction between greater
and lesser moral importance ascribable to a given individualistic
right-justifying feature – instead, even right-justifying features of
lesser moral importance will be as usefully served by assistance
rights as by non-interference rights. So the fact that individualistic
right-justifying features are sometimes of moderate rather than great
moral importance does not undermine my inference from (i) to (ii).
B. The burdens and conflicts of assistance
The duties correlative to rights of assistance are generally more
burdensome than the duties correlative to non-interference rights;
also, rights of assistance tend to generate many conflicts, while non-
interference rights generate fewer conflicts.16 These facts suggest
16 There can be some extremely burdensome non-interference rights (e.g. it is
burdensome for a parent to respect a divorced partner’s custodial rights over their
child, even though these are primarily non-interference rights). And assistance rights
need not always generate conflicts; in some situations (e.g. with abundant resources),
it might turn out that everyone can be given the assistance they need. Nonetheless,
assistance rights tend to involve more burdensome duties than non-interference rights,
because assisting tends to involve more time and effort than merely refraining from
interfering with someone (Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community, pp. 94–
100); and assistance rights tend to generate more conflicts than non-interference rights –
for example, if both you and Philip hold rights to the assistance of a heart pacemaker,
then your rights will conflict if society’s resources can only afford to buy one pacemaker.
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that any reasons in favour of assistance rights are likely frequently
to be overridden by countervailing concerns about the burdens and
conflicts that would be created by assistance rights. On this basis, an
opponent of my inference from (i) to (ii) might argue that even when
individualistic right-justifying features could be protected or promoted
by certain assistance rights, such right-justifying features will not
normally justify these assistance rights; instead, putative justifications
for assistance rights will normally be overridden by considerations
about the burdens and conflicts that the assistance rights would
generate.
This is not a genuine difficulty for premiss (A). This premiss
maintains merely that any right-justifying feature that justifies non-
interference rights for an individual will also constitute at least weak,
overrideable reason in favour of assistance rights for that individual.
Premiss (A) is thereby compatible with the contention that most
reasons in favour of assistance rights will normally be overridden
by considerations about the burdens and conflicts that the assistance
rights would generate.
C. A ‘basic moral difference’ between assistance and non-interference
Some theorists hold that all assistance rights are, as a matter of
basic moral fact, in some way intrinsically less important than non-
interference rights. I shall call this ‘the basic moral difference thesis’.17
There are various versions of the basic moral difference thesis, and only
one would undermine my inference from (i) to (ii). This is the extreme
version which holds that there can never be any reason – even a weak
overrideable reason – in favour of assistance rights. If this extreme
version is correct, then of course the fact that Ingrid’s need to continue
living would be usefully protected by Ingrid’s holding assistance rights
cannot be a reason in favour of such assistance rights because, as a
matter of ‘basic moral fact’, there can never be such pro-assistance-
rights reasons.
Staunch libertarians might dig their heels in here and endorse the
extreme version of the basic moral difference thesis. But there is little
to recommend this extreme version. First, intuitively it seems to me
that there must sometimes be at least weak, overrideable reasons in
favour of assistance rights. If my holding a certain assistance right
(e.g. to subsistence provisions) would offer the best way to protect some
very important aspect of me (e.g. this right would save my life), and this
rightwould not place enormous burdens on others, then it is plausible to
17 For discussion, see for example Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights, pp. 345–6;
Warren Quinn, ‘Actions, Intentions and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and
Allowing’, in his Morality and Action (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 149–74.
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maintain that there must be some reasons – though perhaps weak and
overridden – favouring my holding such an assistance right. Second,
this intuition can be supported. Individualistic justifications of rights
are teleological in the following sense: they maintain that certain
intrinsically important features of an individual (perhaps certain
interests, freedoms, projects) constitute the ends or tele of justifications
of rights held by that individual. These features of the individual
stand out as demanding a response appropriate to their value, and
the individual’s rights are justified as means of respecting, serving or
promoting these valuable features. It follows that when respect for
these individualistic right-justifying features could be as well secured
by assistance rights as non-interference rights, the individualistic
approach must generate at least weak pro tanto reasons in favour of
assistance rights. A critic of my inference from (i) to (ii) might deny
that all genuinely individualistic theories must be teleological, but I do
not see how such a denial could work. Popular non-teleological theories
of rights – such as Kantian constructivism or contractarianism – are
non-individualistic, and it is very unclear how a right could be justified
as the appropriate response to the great intrinsic value of some feature
of its holder, without that justification being teleological in the sense
outlined here.18
Less extreme versions of the basic moral difference thesis do not
deny that there can ever be reasons in favour of assistance rights;
they merely regard such reasons as always intrinsically less important
than the reasons supporting non-interference rights. But so long as
it is possible for there to be reasons favouring assistance rights,
then premiss (A) is not undermined. Premiss (A) claims merely that
whenever there exists a genuine individualistic right-justifying feature
of a person P, then that feature would constitute at least weak,
overrideable reason in favour of assistance rights for P. This premiss is
compatible with the thesis that reasons in favour of non-interference
18 Are self-ownership-based individualistic justifications teleological? In my view, if
they are not then they are not genuinely individualistic. A genuinely individualistic self-
ownership based theory will regard the importance of some aspect of the individual
(perhaps the basic importance of the individual as such, or the importance of the
individual’s sovereignty over himself or herself or, as Locke (Two Treatises of Government,
I. 92) puts it, ‘the Subsistence and Comfort’ of the individual) as the telos of justifications
of rights for that individual; on this approach, the individual’s rights – including his or
her fundamental self-ownership rights – are justified as appropriately serving, respecting
or promoting this telos. By contrast, a self-ownership-based theory that offered no
teleological grounding for rights but instead took the existence of certain self-ownership
rights for everyone as ‘basic’ and ungrounded could not be individualistic: it would not
regard the individual’s rights as grounded in the intrinsic importance of some aspect of
the right-holder.
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rights will always, as a matter of ‘basic moral fact’, be more important
than reasons in favour of assistance rights.
I have completedmy defence of premiss (A). Any individualistic right-
justifying feature of a person P would be usefully supported by P’s
holding both non-interference rights and assistance rights. And we
have seen no reason to reject the conclusion that any individualistic
right-justifying feature that justifies non-interference rights for P will
therefore also constitute at least a weak, overrideable reason in favour
of assistance rights for P.19
III. PREMISS (B)
The second premiss of my argument is:
Premiss (B): property rights primarily comprise rights to non-interference.
My property rights in my pen comprise privileges to use my pen
in various ways, and claims protecting these privileges from being
impeded by various sorts of actions of others, plus powers to alienate
these claims and privileges (e.g. through selling my pen).20 I am not
protected, by my property-right-based claims, against every possible
impediment to my using my pen as I wish. For example, if I become
too old and weak to use my pen, my property rights do not include a
claim that I be assisted in using it. Rather, the claims conferred by my
property rights in my pen are primarily claims to non-interference.
Similarly, property rights in houses, telephones, money, ideas all
primarily comprise privileges protected by non-interference claims.
There are perhaps some claims to assistance included within the
cluster of rights which constitute one’s property rights in something.
For example, I think that property rights include claims that one’s
goods be returned to one when they have been stolen (or else that
one be compensated). And property rights include claims that one’s
executors carry out one’s bequests.21 But property rights involve no
19 One alternative line of criticismmightmaintain that there are certain individualistic
right-justifying features – such as autonomy – that could never be served or respected by
assistance rights. But I do not believe there are any such features. For example, respect
for a person’s autonomy can require assisting that person (e.g. by educating or informing
them), instead of mere non-interference. See Raz, The Morality of Freedom, pp. 407–12.
20 My terminology here draws on Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions
(New Haven, 1964), pp. 35–64. In my view, a right can be constituted by a single claim,
privilege, power, immunity or liability, or by some cluster of several claims or several
privileges or several powers or several immunities or several liabilities, or by somemixed
cluster (e.g. involving claims plus privileges or immunities plus powers plus privileges
etc.). See my ‘Rights: Beyond Interest Theory and Will Theory?’, Law and Philosophy 23
(2004), and my ‘Why Aren’t Duties Rights?’, The Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2006).
21 Alan Ryan, Property (Milton Keynes, 1987), p. 62 and pp. 83–4. Some have
questioned whether property rights genuinely include any rights to assistance. Although
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claims to assistance beyond a few of this sort. This is a conceptual
truth: property rights are primarily claims to non-interference.22
IV. FROM PREMISSES (A) AND (B) TO (C)
My discussion of premisses (A) and (B) should be understood as
implying the following:
Intermediate conclusion (C): any individualistic justification of property rights
for a particular person will also generate at least weak overrideable reasons
in favour of more assistance rights for that person than simply those few
assistance rights (such as rights to have his or her property returned to him or
her after theft, and rights to assistance with bequest) that are included within
the person’s property rights.
For example, consider an individualistic justification for property rights
based on the moral importance of the individual’s continued living. If
Philip’s property rights in his food are justified by the individualistic
right-justifying importance of Philip’s continued living, then Philip’s
continued living will also constitute at least a weak overrideable
reason in favour of assistance rights additional and parallel to Philip’s
property rights in his food (such as rights requiring that Philip be given
medical care if needed for his continued living, and that he be provided
with food if he cannot afford to buy any). My discussion of premisses
(A) and (B) suggests that there could be no individualistic justification
for Philip’s property rights in his food that would not also constitute
at least a weak, overrideable reason for some such parallel, additional
assistance rights.
V. PREMISS (D)
For some property rights, the features of the property owner that could
individualistically justify those property rights would also constitute
reasons-in-favour-of-additional-assistance-rights that it is plausible to
I think such a view mistaken, it is notable that this view would sharpen rather than
weaken my argument: if property rights include no rights to assistance then, given
premiss (A), any individualistic justification for a particular person’s property rights
must obviously also generate reasons in favour of assistance rights additional to those
property rights, as my intermediate conclusion (C) asserts.
22 Most of the rights which A. M. Honore´ regards as comprising ownership are
non-interference rights. For example, Honore´’s ‘right to possess’, ‘right to use’, ‘right
to manage’ and ‘right to the capital’ are all constituted primarily by claims to non-
interference (A.M.Honore´, ‘Ownership’,Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: A Collaborative
Work, ed. A. G. Guest (Oxford, 1961), pp. 107–47). Similarly, Frank Snare’s analysis
of property rights highlights their character as non-interference rights, as does
J. E. Penner’s analysis, which stresses the ‘right of exclusive use’ (which he elaborates
as a right of non-interference) (Frank Snare, ‘The Concept of Property’, American
Philosophical Quarterly 9 (1972), pp. 200–6; Penner, The Idea of Property in Law,
pp. 68–104 and 128–52).
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see as genuine reasons. For instance, suppose that Philip owns very
little other than his food; suppose that without his property rights
in his food Philip will starve. In this situation, Philip’s property
rights in his food could be genuinely individualistically justified by
the importance of Philip’s continued living. For, crucially, the right-
justifying importance of Philip’s continued living also constitutes at
least a weak overrideable reason in favour of additional assistance
rights (such as a right to be provided with food if Philip cannot
afford to buy any, and a right to medical assistance when Philip’s
life is threatened) for which it is plausible to see there as genuinely
being at least weak, overrideable reason. Similarly, if Philip’s property
rights in his food were essential to secure Philip an essential degree
of autonomy, then again in this situation Philip’s property rights
in his food could be genuinely individualistically justified. For the
right-justifying importance of Philip’s attaining an essential degree
of autonomy constitutes at least a weak, overrideable reason in favour
of additional assistance rights (such as a right to a minimal education)
for which it is plausible to see there as genuinely being at least weak,
overrideable reason.
But most property rights do not fit this picture. My premiss (D)
asserts:
Premiss (D): for most of the property rights that are recognized by current legal
systems in wealthy nations, any features of the property owner that might
appear capable of grounding individualistic justifications for those property
rights would also constitute at least weak, overrideable reasons in favour of
additional parallel assistance rights for which it would be implausible to see
there as being genuine reason.
This is because most of the property rights in wealthy nations protect
much more than the property-holder’s vital interests or essential
freedoms. It is plausible that there are reasons in favour of assistance
rights protecting people’s vital interests and essential freedoms (such
as Philip’s continued living or his minimal autonomy), but it is not
plausible that there are even weak overrideable reasons in favour of
assistance rights protecting the features of a wealthy person that their
property rights in inessential goods protect.
For example, consider Maureen’s property rights in her expensive
new car. Let us assume that Maureen is fairly wealthy, with many
assets in addition to her car. In this situation, what feature of Maureen
might ground an individualistic justification for her property rights
in her expensive new car? Note that these property rights cannot
be individualistically justified by Maureen’s vital interest in simply
continuing to live or by Maureen’s simply attaining an essential
degree of autonomy because, given Maureen’s wealthy circumstances,
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her property rights in her expensive new car secure so much more
than a bare essential degree of autonomy for her, and do so much
more than ensure her continued living, that such property rights
cannot be justified merely as a necessary response to her essential
autonomy or interest in continued living. Instead, might Maureen’s
property rights in her expensive new car be justified on the basis
that Maureen’s interest-in-using-her-talents-to-secure-herself-a-fairly-
high-level-of-resources is of individualistic right-justifying importance?
If this interest were sufficient on its own to ground a justification for
Maureen’s property rights in her car, then (C) tells us that this interest
would also constitute at least a weak overrideable reason in favour
of additional assistance rights protecting this interest. For example,
this interest of Maureen’s in using her talents to secure a fairly high
level of resources would constitute at least a weak, overrideable reason
in favour of rights to the free assistance of a ‘shopping consultant’,
who would help Maureen select an appropriate car. But it is, I think,
extremely implausible to hold that there could be any reason – even
a weak, overrideable reason – in favour of such assistance rights for
wealthy Maureen. And thus it is implausible to hold that Maureen’s
property rights in her expensive new car are justified by her interest
in using her talents to secure herself a fairly high level of resources.
The difficulty for the individualistic approach is that, given
Maureen’s wealthy circumstances, any feature of Maureen to which
one might appeal in attempting to offer an individualistic justification
for her property rights in her expensive new car would turn out also
to qualify as a reason in favour of assistance rights for which it
would be implausible to see there as being any genuine reason (even
weak, overrideable reason). The importance of Maureen’s attaining
the high level of autonomy that her expensive car provides, or her
interest in making herself look smart, are features of Maureen that,
if of individualistic right-justifying importance, would justify her
holding property rights in her expensive new car. But they would
each also constitute at least weak, overrideable reasons in favour of
additional assistance rights for Maureen (e.g. rights to be assisted
in attaining the high level of autonomy involved in driving at high
speeds in a valuable status symbol, or rights to free provision of
a beauty makeover) for which it is implausible that there are even
weak overrideable reasons.23 It seems to me to be a brute moral fact
23 One might think that Maureen’s property rights in her expensive new car are
justified by her interest in using her high monetary income as she wishes. But this will
only qualify as an individualistic justification if Maureen’s property rights in her high
income are themselves individualistically justified. Perhaps her property rights in her
high income appear individualistically justified by her self-ownership. But it is doubtful
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that – barring unusual circumstances (e.g. where a shopping consultant
is necessary to compensate for a severe disability) – there can be
no reasons whatsoever (not even weak and overridden) in favour of
additional assistance rights parallel to wealthy people’s property rights
in inessential goods. The free assistance of shopping consultants or
free provision of status symbols is, in my view, just not something to
which a person who is already wealthy can ever normally have a right,
nor can there even be weak overrideable reasons in favour of such a
right.
Similar difficulties beset my earlier example of Jill’s carpentry
project. If Jill’s property rights in the wood were genuinely justified by
the moral importance of Jill’s pursuit of her chosen table-making plan,
then (C) tells us that there must also be at least weak overrideable
reason in favour of Jill’s holding additional assistance rights, parallel
to her property rights in the wood. For example, there would be reason
in favour of Jill’s holding rights to carpentry lessons if she lacks skills in
woodwork. But if Jill is already fairly wealthy, then it is not plausible to
see there as being such reasons (even if weak and overrideable). Rather,
I suspect that – unless the wood is essential for Jill’s survival, or for
the securing of an essential degree of autonomy for Jill – any feature of
Jill that might appear to justify her property rights in the lump of wood
would turn out also to qualify as a reason in favour of assistance rights
for which it is not plausible that there is genuine reason. It follows that
Jill’s property rights in her lump of wood cannot be individualistically
justified.
Note that my argument applies to contextually specific property
rights, property rights held by specific people in specific situations,
rather than to general types of property rights (such as ‘all property
rights in expensive cars’ or ‘all property rights in lumps of wood’). If the
lump of wood offered Jill’s only means of survival, or if the wood offered
the onlymeans of securing an essential degree of autonomy for Jill, then
her property rights in the wood might be individualistically justifiable.
For in these circumstances, Jill’s property rights in the lump of wood
would be individualistically justifiable on the basis of individualistic
right-justifying features (Jill’s survival or Jill’s attaining an essential
degree of autonomy) that would constitute at least weak, overrideable
reasons in favour of assistance rights for which it is plausible that there
that the individualistic right-justifying feature that justifies Maureen’s self-ownership
rights (perhaps the importance of her control over herself – see n. 18 above) would justify
rights to a very high income – for if it were to do so then it would also qualify as at
least a weak, overrideable reason in favour of implausibly extensive assistance rights,
assistance rights to the provision of the very great control that a high income secures
(such as rights to the existence of an economic system that places a high monetary value
on Maureen’s talents).
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are genuinely at least weak, overrideable reasons (such as rights to the
resources necessary for survival, or to the resources necessary for an
essential degree of autonomy). Similarly, if Maureen’s circumstances
were less wealthy, her property rights in her expensive new car might
be individualistically justifiable. Suppose that Maureen loses all her
assets except her expensive new car (perhaps her house burns down and
her bank is robbedwhile she is out driving). Under these circumstances,
her property rights in her car might turn out to offer her only means
of attaining an essential minimum level of freedom and perhaps even,
through selling the car, her only means of continued livelihood. In this
situation, Maureen’s property rights in her expensive car are plausibly
individualistically justifiable, because in this situation her property
rights in the car are justifiable on the basis of features of Maureen
(such as her attaining an essential minimum level of freedom, or
her continued living) that constitute reasons in favour of additional
assistance rights (such as rights to medical care enabling Maureen to
continue to live) that it is plausible to see as genuine reasons.
VI. CONCLUSION OF THE ARGUMENT
The argument does not establish that no property rights can be
individualistically justified. Rather, it establishes that if certain
contextually specific property rights are individualistically justified,
then there must also be at least weak, overrideable reasons in favour
of the additional parallel assistance rights that would protect those
morally important features of the property holder that justify the
property rights in question. Some property rights in particular contexts
(e.g. those which protect the individual’s continued living, like Philip’s
property rights in his food) are plausibly accompanied by reasons
supporting such additional parallel assistance rights. Others are not
(e.g. Maureen’s property rights in her expensive new car, when held in
a context in which Maureen owns many other assets as well). These
latter property rights cannot be individualistically justified.
VII. AN OBJECTION: STATE ENFORCEMENT
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Many states expend considerable resources to defend and enforce
the property rights of their members. The police service, the judicial
system, environmental protection agencies and CCTV surveillance
systems all play amajor role in defending and enforcing property rights.
The property-protecting activities of these bodies should perhaps be
construed as assistance for property-owners. This construal of the
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state enforcement of property rights might be used to develop a
criticism of my argument. The criticism accepts that individualistic
justifications for property rights would generate reasons in favour of
a range of assistance rights. The criticism questions (D)’s assertion
that the assistance rights that would be supported by individualistic
justifications are, in the case of most property rights, assistance rights
for which it is implausible to see there being genuine reasons. Instead,
the criticism contends that all property rights are matched by certain
assistance rights that it is plausible to ascribe to property-owners:
rights to the assistance of the state in the protection of property
(through the work of the police, the judiciary, etc.).
This criticism should be rejected because individualistic justifications
for property rights would support significantly more extensive
assistance rights than mere rights to the assistance of the state in the
protection of property. My examples have already made this clear: the
assistance rights supported by putative individualistic right-justifying
features (such as Philip’s continued living, or Jill’s carpentry project)
go beyond mere property-protection rights – instead, they include such
rights as a right to medical assistance, or a right to carpentry
lessons.
In response, a defender of the criticism might modify their point
by arguing that while individualistic justifications appear to generate
reasons in favour of extensive assistance rights, the excessive demands
that would be placed upon a society’s resources by such extensive
assistance rights override the reasons for such assistance rights.
Instead, the defender of the criticismmight argue that in protecting the
owner’s property rights through the police and the judiciary, the state
has done enough by way of positive assistance for those features of
right-holders which justify their property rights. The difficulty for this
line of criticism is that if one accepts that the excessive ‘demandingness’
of such rights asMaureen’s right to a free shopping consultant overrides
the reasons in favour of such rights (leaving justification only for the
less extensive assistance rights which are met by the state enforcement
of property rights), then one offers an implausible explanation for
why excessively demanding assistance rights are not justified. Rather
than maintain that Maureen would have held extensive assistance
rights, including a right to a shopping consultant, were such rights
not excessively demanding, it is more plausible to maintain that
there is no reason, not even an overridden one, for Maureen’s right
to a shopping consultant. To adopt this stance, one must abandon
the individualistic approach to the justification of Maureen’s property
rights in her expensive new car. Only on this basis will one eschew
the implausible view that there are overrideable reasons in favour of
extensive assistance rights for Maureen.
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VIII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT
My argument implies that the only property rights that can be justified
individualistically are those – like Philip’s property rights in his food –
that are individualistically justifiable on the basis of features of the
property-owner that also support additional assistance rights for which
it is plausible that there could be at least weak, overrideable reason.
This delineates a limit to the success of any individualistic approach to
property rights. For most of the specific property rights recognized by
existent legal systems in wealthy nations – such as Maureen’s property
rights in her expensive new car, or Margaret’s property rights in
seven hundred acres of farmland– there are not plausibly even weak,
overrideable reasons in support of additional parallel assistance rights
protecting the features of the property-owner that prima facie one
might think could individualistically justify these property rights. Thus
most of the specific property rights recognized by existent legal systems
in wealthy nations cannot be individualistically justified. If they are
justified at all, then their justification must, despite the claims of such
writers as Locke, Hart and Raz, be non-individualistic.24
I promised to conclude by outlining a two-tier view of rights. This
two-tier picture regards individualistic justification as the hallmark of
human rights, rights that take moral priority over other rights whose
justification is non-individualistic. I am attracted to the following two-
tier view, according to which interests are central to the justification
of all rights, and non-individualistically justified rights are justified on
consequentialist grounds:
• Human rights are justified individualistically, on the basis of the
importance of certain interests of the individual right-holder. I
suggest that the human rightswill normally25 include rights securing
24 It is worth noting why non-individualistic justifications need not generate reasons in
favour of extensive assistance rights, in the way that individualistic justifications must:
non-individualistic goals would often be hampered rather than promoted by endowing
individual people with assistance rights. For example, even in a ‘morally ideal world’ in
which everyone did their best to respect all rights, the stability of a group would often be
best promoted by endowing each member of the group only with non-interference rights
and not assistance rights. By contrast, in a world in which everyone was going to try
to respect all rights, any given individualistic right-justifying feature would always be
best promoted if the relevant individual held assistance rights as well as non-interference
rights (and thus, e.g., the individualistic right-supporting importance of the stability of the
environment for a given individual will always generate reasons in favour of assistance
rights for that individual – such as rights-to-be-provided-with-the-resources-necessary-
to-maintain-his-or-her-stable-environment – as well as non-interference rights).
25 For an argument that any individualistic approach of this typewill imply that human
rights are in a certain sense non-universal, see my ‘Human Rights, Individualism and
Cultural Diversity’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 8
(2005).
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their holder’s continued living and bodily integrity, and rights
securing a minimal level of autonomy for their holder.
• Other rights (including promissory rights and various legally created
rights such as my right to park in a residents’ parking bay) are
justified on the basis of the importance of the collective interest.
• The human rights are more important: they shape what other rights
can be justified.
My two-tier picture reflects the twin facts that (a) sometimes rights
are necessary to protect important interests of individual people,
interests whose individual importance is incompatible with their being
interpersonally aggregated and then maximized (e.g. consider Fred’s
interest in his bodily integrity), but also (b) in other cases rights are
simply of instrumental use in securing collective benefits (e.g. given
the co-ordination problems generated by collective life, rights-creating
regulations can be useful for promoting aggregate welfare – consider
Mary’s right to park in a residents’ parking bay). By regarding the
individualistically justified rights as more important, I hold that it
is more important to respect those aspects of an individual’s rights-
protected realm whose justification is grounded ultimately in the
intrinsic importance of interests of the right-holder, than to respect
those aspects of this realm that are justified by what they do for the
wider community. According to this two-tier picture, my argument
against individualistic justifications for most property rights implies
that most property rights occupy the lower, less important tier of rights.
Perhaps some particular property rights qualify as morally important
human rights, such as Philip’s property rights in his food. But most
property rights do not.
The two-tier picture in the paragraph above requires more
development.26 But this should not obscure the important implications
of the conclusions we have already reached. If most property rights
cannot be individualistically justified, then whether or not my two-tier
theory is correct, we must endorse the following disjunctive conclusion:
either most property rights are unjustified or most property rights are
non-individualistically justified. One cannot accept that most property
rights are justified, without accepting that most of Ingrid’s property
rights will be justified ultimately on the basis of what these rights do
not merely for Ingrid, but for other people as well. This is a conclusion
of significant political import. It entails that most of Ingrid’s property
26 See my ‘The Justification of Property Rights’, esp. pp. 99–102, my ‘Human Rights,
Individualism and Cultural Diversity’, and my ‘Human Rights and Positive Duties’,
Ethics and International Affairs 19 (2005), esp. pp. 36–7.
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rights are unjustified if they do not serve ‘the collective interest’, ‘the
community’ or ‘shared’ or ‘mutual’ concerns.
This conclusion might seem to offer an immediate refutation of
right-wing libertarianism, and a justification for such practices as
compulsory purchase and taxation. But it would be hasty to draw these
inferences. There might be consequentialist or communitarian or some
other non-individualistic reason to eschew taxation and compulsory
purchase, and to endorse the politics of right-wing libertarianism.27
For example, empirical research into the productivity of ‘laissez-
faire’ capitalism might show that a regime of strong property rights
and low taxation better promotes the collective interest than would
alternative regimes. What my argument establishes is not that
right-wing libertarian property systems must be rejected and such
practices as compulsory purchase and taxation must be endorsed,
but that one’s approach to these issues will turn ultimately on non-
individualistic questions (e.g. questions concerning whether right-wing
libertarian property systems or systems involving heavier taxation
better serve ‘the community’ or ‘the collective interest’). This follows
from my conclusion that most of an owner’s property rights are not
fundamentally there to serve that property-owner, but are rather
justified by how they serve the wider community of which that owner
is a part.28
Rowan.Cruft@stir.ac.uk
27 For arguments of broadly this type, see Richard A. Epstein, ‘On the Optimal Mix of
Private and Common Property’ and David Schmidtz, ‘The Institution of Property’, both
in Property Rights, ed. E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller, Jr., and J. Paul (Cambridge, 1994).
28 Early versions of this article were presented at King’s College, Cambridge, and at a
meeting of the Scots Philosophical Club in Stirling. I am grateful for comments received
at these events, and owe special thanks to Jimmy Altham, Michael Brady, Roger Crisp,
Antony Duff, Antony Hatzistavrou, Matthew Kramer, Hallvard Lillehammer, Sandra
Marshall, Nigel Simmonds and Jonathan Wolff.
